Factors Affecting the Development of Land Rental Markets in China A Case Study for Puding County, Guizhou Province by Tu, Qin et al.
 
 
Factors Affecting the Development of Land Rental Markets in China – 






      Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, the Netherlands 




      IFPRI – CAAS International Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD), 
        Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), Beijing 
      International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Beijing Office, Institute of   





      IFPRI – CAAS International Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (ICARD), 







Contributed paper prepared for presentation at the International Association of 
Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, 








Copyright 2006 by Qin Tu, Nico Heerink and Li Xing. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim 
copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright 
notice appears on all such copies. 1.  Introduction 
Introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) 
gives rural households rights to use farmland and keep the residual income from farm activities; 
land remains collectively owned at the village and sub -village level, but individual households 
have a bundle of rights to use it and reap the benefits from the land.  Compared to many studies 
on  the land tenure system and the impact on productive efficiency and investm ent behavior of 
farm households (Carter et al., 1996; Kung and Liu, 1997; Jacoby et al., 2000; Benjamin and 
Brandt, 2002; Li et al., 1998), the land rental market in rural China  receives much less attention 
in the literature. 
According to traditional economic theory, when large landowners have proble ms to supervise 
hired labor, they will rent out their land. But the situation in China is different. Because 
agricultural  land is very scarce and the land-labor ratio is very small,  demand for land is hu ge 
and supply for land is very limited. In addition, rural households often  experienced major 
institutional  problems to transfer their land use right to other  households until  the  late 1990s 
(Kung and Liu, 1997; Brandt et al., 2002). A village -survey undertaken in eight provinces in 
China showed that the percentage of rented-in cultivated land  was only 0.6% in 1988 and 2.9% 
in 1995, respectively (Brandt et al., 2002).  
The available literature on land rental market development is very limited, probably due to 
the small size of such markets until the end of the  1990s. In recent years, with rapid economic 
growth providing  many off-farm employment opportunities for rural households , there has been   1
a rapid increase in the incidence of land rental activities in China. The development of land rental 
markets can enhance agricultural productivity  and incomes by facilitating transfers of land to 
more productive farmers and facilitating the  transfer of labor to  the non-farm economy 
(Deininger and Jin, 2002; Lohmar et al., 2001; Kung, 2002; Zhang et al., 2004 ). 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors affecting the development of land rental 
markets in one of the poorest regions within China, namely Puding County in Guizhou Province, 
and compare the results with those of previous studies on  other regions in China. Data from 792 
households in three villages are used to analyze the participation in land rental markets , using 
probit models of household decision making on land  renting in and  renting out, respectively. The 
main factors analyzed in these models are migr ation, investments in farming, health and 
education status of household members, and demographic and cultural factors. The insights  
obtained from the study can provide an important input into the  design of appropriate policies to 
improve the functioning of  land rental markets in poorer regions and thereby stimulate 
agricultural production and reduce rural poverty.  
A problem with the survey data used in this study, and probably most survey data on land 
rental markets in China, is that rural households that h ave migrated out of the village are not 
included in the sample. These households still hold land use rights in the villages from which 
they migrated, but have generally rented their land out to other households.  In order to solve this 
missing data problem, we use Monte Carlo simulations to examine the effects o f applying binary 
probit models, and develop a  weighted probability  method to correct for missing data  in the 
probit model for land renting out.     2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we discuss the problem of 
missing data and present a model that can be used for solving this problem.  Information on the 
survey,  model specification, and descriptive statistics for the variables used in the  model are 
presented in section 3. Model estimation results are discussed in section 4, while section 5  draws 
some major conclusions. 
2.  Missing Observations Problem 
One important type of household s is missing the survey that was used for this study and  in 
most surveys on rental market development in China, namely households that still belong to the 
village but have migrated to another place. Because the whole household  has moved out of the 
village,  they cannot be interviewed during  the survey. Migrated household will normally rent 
their land out to other households in the village, and will  not rent in land. These missing 
observations in our data set may bias our results if we do not correct for it.  Similar for land 
renting out decision.   
If we assume that the incentives to rent in land are the sam e for migrated households and for 
household  that do not rent  in land,  and, without loss  of  generality, we also assume that their 
incentives to rent in land are smaller than those  for the households that do  rent in, then a binary 
probit model can be used to estimate the household land  renting  in decision.
1  We assume that 
probabilities of a random household belong ing to the group of migrated and renting  in 
households are pm=m and pRI=pI respectively; then the probability of  belonging to the not renting 
                                                             
1  Alternatively,  it may be assumed that the u tility of renting-in land is lowest for migrated household and  the utility of land 
renting-out is highest for migrated households. In  this case, and ordered probit model should be used, and should be corrected for 
missing obser vations. The resulting approach is m ore complex than correction of the binary probit model.         3
in household group is pNI=1-pI-m.  The probabilities of a renting in and not renting in household 


















  respectively. If 
we could observe the migrated group, the “real” proba bilities of  renting in and not renting in are 
pI  and  1-pI respectively.  It follows  that  I RI p p > ¢  and I NI p p - < ¢ 1 ,  in other words that we 
over-sampled the renting in group and under-sampled the not renting in group. 
A latent (unobserved) continuous variable
*
i y , measuring the incentive (or utility) of renting 
in land for household i is given as: i i i x y e b + ¢ =
* . Here, xi is a vector of observed variables 
for  household  i related to  renting  in decision making,  b are unknown parameters we want to 
estimate, and  e is a normally distributed error term with unit variance and zero mean  (for 
normalization). We observe yi, a discrete choice of each h ousehold i: if 0
* > i y , yi=1 and the 
household will rent in land; if 0
* £ i y ,  yi=0 and the household will not rent in land. Then the 
probabilities of  yi=1 and yi=0 are  ) ( b i x¢ F   and  ) ( b i x¢ - F  respectively. Conditional on missing 
migrated household s, the log-likelihood of household renting in decision after correcting for  the 
sampling problem is as follows:  
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2 , are probability weights for 
correcting the sampling problem of missing migrated h ouseholds. Maximizing the log likelihood 
LRI can solve this pro blem if we know m and p beforehand. 
We can apply the same methodo logy to solve the problem of  missing observations  for the 
renting  out decision.  We  assume that migrated households rent out thei r land.  Let  the   4
probabilities for these three types of households,  not  renting  out,  renting  out, and migrated  
households,  be equal to 1-pO-m, pO and m respectively. Then, after correcting for the sampling 
problem, we can write the log-likelihood of the  renting  out decision conditional on missing 
migrated household as f ollows: 
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2  are probability 
weights for correct ing the sampling problem of missing migrated households. 
We expect that the bias caused by the missing data is relatively small for renting in, because 
the probability of migrating is quite small in our data and the probability of not renting  in is 
large. The missing migrated group will not affect the result s  much, because  the  probability 
weights  w1 and  w2 are close to 1 and the weighted log-likelihood is similar to the unweighted 
one. But for  the  renting  out decision, the bias is expected to be much  larger, because the 
probabilities of  renting  out and migration are  both  small. With the  migrated  household  group 
missing, the probability weight  r1 is  much larger than 1, and the weighted log-likelihood will 
differ considerably from the unweighted one. 
Our expectation is proved by Monte Carlo simulation
2.  Hence, it can be  concluded that the 
corrected  binary  model  should be preferred over the standard binary model   for  explaining 
household land renting out decisions when migrated households are  missing from the sample. 
 
                                                             
2  We don’t present our result of  Monte Carlo s imulation here because of limitation of paper length, anybody who is interested in 
the result can ask the authors.    5
3.  Model Specification and  Data 
The data we use in this study come  from a stratified survey held  in three villages in 
Chengguan town, Puding County, a traditional rural county in Guizhou Province in south -west 
China. The  survey  was conducted by Guizhou university in February 2005, and  mainly 
concentrated on public service s and poverty  issues.  The questionnaire contains detailed 
information about demography, housing, annual income (in the year 2004), annual expenditures 
on (food and non-food) consumption and durables, and household access to public services.  The 
survey is a full-sample survey; all 805 farm households that were present  in these three villages 
were interviewed. After cleaning the data and deleting observations  with missing values, a final 
sample of 792 households could be used for our purpose . 
From the survey  we know that about 5% of the households migrated out of the villages and 
could not be interviewed. Of the 792 households in sample,  151 indicated that they rent in land. 
Assuming that the migrated households do not  rent  in land, this means that 18.1% of the 
households  rent  in land. Only 63 households  in the sample rent  out land. Assuming that all 
migrated households rent  out their land to other households, this means that 12.6% of the 
households rent out land, there is an active land rental market in these three villages. 
Table 1 Percentages of households involved in land rental market,  corrected for migration 
Renting in  Renting out 
Choice  % of households  Choice  % of households 
Renting in  18.1%  Renting out (observed)  7.6% 
Not renting in (observed)  76.9%  Migrated (missi ng)  5.0% 
Migrated (missi ng)  5.0%  Total renting out  12.6% 
Total not  renting in  81.9%  Not renting out  87.4%   6
Quotas were abolished at the time of the survey. Moreover, land reallocations had never 
taken place in the three villages were the su rvey was held. Contrary to previous studies, we 
therefore cannot examine the impact of these two institutional factors on land rental market 
development.   
Table 2  Definitions of variables used in the empirical analys es 
Gender  Gender of household head: 1 ma le, 0 female 
Minority  Dummy variable for belonging to minority: 1 yes, 0 no  
Age  Age of household head  
Age-sq  Age-squared of head / 100  
Num  Number of members in household  
Nlabor  Number of labor forc e members in household: members aged 16 -65 
Nkid  Number of children aged 6 years or less  
Poverty  Dummy variable for po verty: 1 yes, 0  no 
Saving  Logarithm of savings deposi ts in bank (in Yuan) 
Nout  Number of household members involved  in off-farm empl oyment 
Landp  Land per labor  force member (in mu) 
Landp-sq  Land per labor for ce member squared (in mu)  
Wasland  Dummy variable for having opened up was teland: 1 yes,  0 no 
Garden  Log (area of garden land + 1)  
Wood  Log (area of forest land + 1)  
Edu  Years of education  of household head  
Edu-sq  Years-squared of education of household head  
Train1  Dummy variable for member having training for agricultural  techniques: 1 yes, 0  no 
Train2  Dummy variable for at least one member having training for non-agricultural skills: 1 yes, 0 no  
Dis1  Number of household members  that had a disease last year  
Dis2  Number of labor  force members that had a disease la st year 
Relation  Dummy variable for having relatives and friends who are loc al official s: 1 yes, 0 no 
Cadre  Dummy variable for having cadre  in the household: 1 yes, 0  no 
Party  Dummy variable for having communist party members in the household: 1 yes,  0 no 
Machine  Dummy variable for pre sence of agricultural machinery: 1 yes, 0 no  
Animal  Dummy variable for pr esence of dra ught animal: 1 yes, 0 no 
Invest  Dummy variable for investment in land: 1 yes, 0 no  
Infrice  Dummy variable for receiving extension about rice: 1 yes, 0 no 
Infcorn  Dummy variable for receiving extension about corn: 1 yes, 0 no  
Infcrp  Sum of dummy variabl es for receiving extension about other five main  crops: 0 to 5  
Infani  Sum of dummy variables for receiving extension about four main lives tock and poultry types: 0 to 4    7
Table 2 provides the definitions of all variables in the analyses. Involve ment in off-farm 
employment is not high; only 0.55 out of 4 .23 household members are involved in off -farm 
activities on average. Average farm size is very small, 3.3 mu on average. For China as a whole, 
average farm size is almost 8 mu (NBS, 2004). The majority of  the  households  in the sample 
(72.9%) have land bet ween 1 to 5 mu. Only 15.2% of the households po ssess an agricultural 
machine, while 52% of the households have a draught animal. Almost 30% of the househo lds 
belong to minority groups.  
4.  Results 
As we explain in section 2,  we used the standard binary probit  model for estimating land 
renting  in decisions, while we use a  binary probit model corrected for missing observations to 
estimate land renting out decisions. The estimation results for land  renting in and renting out are 
shown in  Table 3. 
Table 3 Results of binary probit model for land  renting in decision 
V ariable  Renting in (no correction)   Renting out (with correc tion) 
V ariable  Parameter  t-stat.  dF/dx  Parameter  t-stat.  dF/dx 
Gender  0.990**  2.18  0.129**  -0.067  -0.25  -0.010 
Minority  -0.520**  -3.70  -0.102**  -0.769**  -3.57  -0.090** 
Age  0.099**  2.35  0.022**  -0.034  -1.02  -0.005 
Age-sq  -0.126**  -2.82  -0.028**  0.034  1.00  0.005 
Num  0.093*  1.71  0.020*  -0.268**  -3.24  -0.039** 
Nlabor  -0.021  -0.26  -0.005  0.047  0.43  0.007 
Nkid  -0.300**  -3.05  -0.066**  0.101  0.69  0.015 
Poverty  0.066  0.34  0.015  -0.369  -1.64  -0.044 
Saving  0.003  0.11  0.001  0.064**  2.64  0.009** 
Nout  -0.055  -0.65  -0.012  0.341**  3.79  0.049** 
Landp  -0.246**  -2.01  -0.054**  0.153  0.94  0.022 
Landp-sq  0.026  1.47  0.006  -0.012  -0.48  -0.002 
Wasland  -0.379**  -2.06  -0.071**  0.151  0.68  0.024   8
Garden  0.021  0.25  0.005  -0.201  -1.18  -0.029 
Wood  -0.408*  -1.89  -0.090*  -0.024  -0.07  -0.003 
Edu  0.022  0.38  0.005  -0.085  -1.41  -0.012 
Edu-sq  -0.003  -0.51  -0.001  0.011**  2.14  0.002** 
Train1  -0.281  -0.87  -0.053  0.090  0.29  0.014 
Train2  -0.097  -0.40  -0.020  -0.034  -0.14  -0.005 
Dis1  0.172  1.48  0.038  -0.037  -0.23  -0.005 
Dis2  -0.214  -1.42  -0.047  0.241  1.21  0.035 
Machine  0.260*  1.65  0.063*  -0.212  -0.88  -0.028 
Animal  0.164  1.36  0.036  -0.133  -0.83  -0.019 
Invest  0.412*  1.94  0.108*  -0.002  -0.01  0.000 
Relation  0.276*  1.69  0.068*  -0.186  -0.95  -0.024 
Cadre  0.066  0.22  0.015  0.398  1.33  0.073 
Party  0.153  0.56  0.036  0.205  0.80  0.033 
Infrice  -0.074  -0.56  -0.016  -0.456**  -2.97  -0.067** 
Infcorn  0.160  0.94  0.034  -0.245  -1.43  -0.038 
Infcrp  0.133**  2.34  0.029**  0.019  0.24  0.003 
Infani  0.011  0.20  0.002  0.110  1.52  0.016 
Constant  -3.81**  -3.60    0.539  0.62   
Log likelihood  -325.3      -239.7     
Pseudo R
2  0.157      0.199     
* is significant at 10% level, ** is significant at 5% level.  
4.1 Demographic characteristics 
A male household head is more likely to rent in land, but gender has no significant effect on 
household land renting out decision. Minority people are significantly  more inactive in the land 
rental market as compared to majority (Han nat ionality) people. Traditional cultural beliefs often 
impede the participation of minorities in markets, including land rental markets.  The age of 
household head does not affect land renting out decisions  significantly;  it has a robust inverse 
U-shaped pattern for land renting in decisions.  This inverse U-shaped age pattern is consistent 
with the findings of Kung (2002). A possible explanation is that middle -aged farmers are more 
efficient than younger or older farmers, because they have more experience than  younger farmers   9
and have more physical strength than older farmers. 
Household with more  members is more likely to rent in land, and less likely to rent out land. 
The number of labor force members in the household has no significant effects both on 
household land renting in and  renting out decisions. It should be noted, however, that land per 
labor force member is a separate explanatory variable in the analysis. So, given this land -labor 
ratio, the number of laborers in a family does not have an independent  effect on land renting 
decisions. The number of young children in a household has a significant negative effect on land 
renting in. With more children younger than six years old in a household, parents need more time 
to take care of them, and do  not have enough time to work on rented land. 
4.2 Household assets 
Households with more savings in the bank are more likely to  rent out land, while renting in 
land is not affected. Households are poor  because of lack labor do not significant rent out more 
land or rent  in less land. This finding is consistent with the insignificant impact of lab or force 
size discussed in 4.2 above.   
4.3 Off-farm employment 
The number of household members havin g an off-farm job significantly affects the 
probability of land renting out. But off-farm employment does not change the probability of 
renting in significantly. This result confirms findings of previous studies that improved off -farm 
job opportunities increase the supply of land and  is a major factor driving the development of 
village Land rental markets.   
4.4 Land resources   10
As expected, households with more land per laborer are less likely to rent in land. But land 
availability has no significant effect on land  renting out decisions.  The large land scarcity in the 
surveyed villages, with 92% of  the  households  having  less than three mu contracted land per 
laborer and 97% of the households having  less than five mu per labor er may explain the latter 
result. This result  indicates that the land rental market is  mainly driven by off-farm employment 
in  areas  with  high land scarcity. Without off-farm job opportunities, even  households  with 
relatively large land endowments  do not rent out their land, and the land rental market  is absent 
due to lack of supply. 
Other land resource variables in the models  are the exploitation of waste land, and the areas 
of garden land and forest land available to the households.  As expected, the exploitation of waste 
land and the availability of forest land have a significant negative effect on land renting in. 
Availability of garden land, however, does not have a significant effect. All three variables do not 
affect the renting out of land. This again confirms that off -farm employment, not land availab ility, 
may drive the development of the land rental markets in the rese arch area. 
4.5 Human capital 
The education level of household  head  has different effects on land renting in and out. 
Contrary to Kung (2002) and Zhang et al. (2004) , we find that education does not affect land 
renting in. Instead, we find that education has a  significant positive effect on land renting out.  A 
possible explanation may be that household with higher educated head  earns higher income from 
off-farm employment, therefore has fewer incentive to earn an income from agriculture. 
Training in agricultural skills or non-agricultural skills, however, does not significantly affect   11
land renting in or  renting out decisions. We expect households with training in agricultural skills 
to be more efficient in farming and therefore have more incentives to rent in lan d, while 
households with training in non -agricultural skills may obtain higher earnings from off -farm 
employment  and therefore are more likely to rent out land. A possible explanation for the 
insignificant results for the two training variables is that the  quality of the training is not high.   
The number of  household and labor force  members  that had a disease last year  has  no 
significant effects on both renting in and renting out decisions. Because land is very scarce in the 
research area and labor is abundant, the occurrence of diseases probably does not significantly 
affect household land rental decisions. 
4.6 Social capital 
Higher social capital may mean better possibilities to rent in land, but it may also mean better 
access to relatively high-paid local off-farm jobs. Only the first variable has a significant effect 
on decision to  rent in land. The renting out of land is not significantly affected by the social 
capital of households in the research area.   
4.7 Agricultural assets 
Households with more investment  in agriculture are expected to have more incentives to rent 
in land. The probit model results show investments in land and machines indeed significantly 
affect land renting in. Investments in agricultural assets, however, do not significantly affect the 
decision of land renting out. This result again confirms that the supply of land is not driven by 
agriculture-related factors in the research area.   
4.8 Access to extension   12
Access to extension services has mixed effects on land renting in and out. Households 
receiving information on other crops than rice and maize are more likely to rent in land than 
households that do not receive such information. And  households that receive information on rice 
farming are less likely to rent out land than other households. Recei ving information on maize 
and livestock does not see m to affect land rental behavior. It is not clear what causes these 
different responses for different types of extension services.    
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we use data for three villages in one of the p oorest provinces in China, Guizhou 
Province, to analyze the factors affecting the development of land rental markets . A major 
advance compared to the few available studies on land rental market development in China is the 
use of a weighted probabilities approach in the model for land renting out in order to correct for 
missing data caused by migrated  households.   
The main finding of the research is that the land rental market is mainly driven by off -farm 
employment; land-labor ratios do not play a significa nt role in land renting out . Without off-farm 
job opportunities, households are unlikely to rent out their land, and the land rental market does 
not work if there is no supply. This finding confirms the results of previous studies for China. 
The sample contains information on the number of household members involved in off -farm 
employment, but not on the earnings obtained from off-farm employment. We find, however, that 
the level of education of the household head and the size of the savings in a bank both  affect land 
renting out positively. Both education of t he household head and savings deposits are likely to be 
positively correlated with the ear nings obtained from off-farm employment.   13
Another important finding is  that households belonging to minority gro ups are significantly 
more inactive in the land rental market. The age of the household head shows an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with land renting in.  Participation in off-farm employment is relatively 
low in the research area used for this stud y. Only 0.55 household members on a total household 
size of 4.23 have an off-farm job on average. With further increases in off -farm work, the land 
rental market is expected to develop further. Households belonging to minority groups, however, 
are unlikely to participate much. Appropriate measures taken by local governments to stimulate 
land rental participation by minority groups can be an important way to stimulate agricultural 
productivity and  total household incomes of  such minority groups. 
  Decisions on off-farm employment may be jointly taken with decisions on land renting out 
and land renting in. Further research in this field may therefore develop and estimate  models of 
household decision making that reflect such joint decisions. In addition,  ordered probit models 
that correct for missing data caused by migrated households may provide a further improvement 
over the corrected binary probit model that we use in this study.   
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